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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by §78-2a-3(j), U.C.A. This is an
appeal from a final judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed
May 23, 1990. On July 31, 1990, this case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-2(4), U.C.A.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

POINT I
NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS, FABIAN AND CLENDENIN, SHOULD
HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE OF THEIR FORMER
REPRESENTATION OF MARGETTS AND HIS FAMILY AND
BUSINESS ENTITIES.

POINT II
THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT WAS A PART OF MARGETTS'
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE A CONDOMINIUM AND TO RELEASE
HIS TRUST DEED AND MUST BE CONSTRUED AS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF THAT TOTAL AGREEMENT.

POINT III

NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT
BECAUSE OF THE ACTS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY WHO HAD ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO
ACT FOR ITS PREDECESSOR AND BECAUSE IT HAS RATIFIED THE
AGREEMENT AND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE AGREEMENT BY
ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS THEREOF.

POINT IV
NEW WEST, AS THE SUCCESSOR, IN INTEREST TO TERRACE
FALLS BY DEED WITHOUT A FORECLOSURE AND BY ITS
PREDECESSOR'S CONTRACT WITH TERRACE FALLS IS BOUND
BY THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS WITH MARGETTS TO
GIVE HIM CREDIT AGAINST THE PRICE FOR HIS CONDOMINIUM
FOR SALES OF OTHER CONDOMINIUMS IN THE PROJECT.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued:

POINT V
MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE AGREEMENTS
WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS LIEN BY IMPROPER
CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION,
MISTAKE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR UNFAIR DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION
OR DAMAGES.
POINT VI
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR RENTAL
VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,100 WAS
UNSUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS CONTFIARY TO
LAW.
POINT VII
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR $21,600 IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR THE LAW AND MUST BE
REVERSED.
POINT VIII
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE OVERTURNED
BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY STATUTE OR AGREEMENT.
POINT IX
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS CONTRARY TO
LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD NOT BE CALCULATED
PRECISELY AND WERE FOR THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE.
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. The issue of disqualification of attorneys involves mixed questions of
fact and law which does not require deference to the findings of the lower
court. The standard of review of the disqualification issue has been held to
be the abuse of discretion standard, Maraulies v. Uochurch. 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985), but some courts review disqualification without deference
to the trial court because the ethical rules governing the legal profession
involve substantial legal questions. Unified Sewaraae Aaencv v. Jelco Inc..
646 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981)
2. The issue of construing several agreements together as one
transaction is a question of law and no deference to the trial court is
required. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d
1357, 1358 (UtahApp. 1987).
3. The remaining issues involve mixed questions of fact and law which
"do not require the deference due to findings on questions of pure fact."
Maraulies v. Upchurch. supra, at 1200. However, to the extent that findings
of fact had to be made to determine the facts of agency (Point III) fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake, unconscionability (Point V),
the existence of a rental agreement (Point VI), benefits conferred (Point VI),
and reasonableness of attorney's fees (Point VIII), the lower court's findings
are to be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support them. But, the
legal conclusions resulting from the facts and the interpretations of the
agreements and of the statutes are questions of law which are reviewed only
for correctness with no deference to the lower court's determination.
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d
(Utah 1988); Asay v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Nielson v.
Nielson. 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989). In particular, the issues of
whether New West is jointly bound with Terrace Falls (Point II), bound by the
acts of its agent (Point III), bound as the successor of Terrace Falls (Point IV),
or bound by ratification and estoppel (Point III), whether the facts found
constitute fraud, negligent misrepresentation, duress, mistake,
unconscionability (Point V), and interpretation of or compliance with any
agreement, rule or statute (Points I, II, III, IV, VII and VIII) are all questions of
law to be reviewed for correctness only. In addition, the issues of
prejudgment interest (Point IX), attorney's fees (Point VIII), and whether it is
inequitable to retain benefits conferred (Point VI) are for the court to decide
and are not trier-of-fact questions. They are to be reviewed for correctness
only.
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for
which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether established by
express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated
without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly
or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent,
or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of
that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises,
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when
he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when
he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, and
remains in possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property,
-w/7-

served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three
days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person
interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and
conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be
performed, then no notice need be given.
§78-36-6 Notice to quit - How served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the
tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his lace of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of
residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
§78-36-10 Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate
enforcement - Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the
restitution of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of
rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
•ix-

(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in
the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced
immediately.
Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client.
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule.
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rule 1.7,1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may no
knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially factually related
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer has associated,
had previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to
that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected
by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
-x-

(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer
unless:
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules
1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

-xi-

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900409-CA

vs.
JOHN L MARGETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff New West Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter
referred to as "New West") filed a Complaint against defendant John L
Margetts (hereinafter referred to as "Margetts") to enforce an agreement to
buy a condominium unit from New West or, in the alternative, to obtain
possession of the property and a judgment for the rental value of the property.
Margetts' Answer asserted that he was coerced into signing the purchase
agreement by fraud and duress and the simultaneous signing of another
agreement which would have given him credit for the full amount of the
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purchase price for the condominium unit and also into giving up a trust deed
lien against the whole condominium project. He counterclaimed for a deed to
the unit, for offsets for expenses paid to complete the unit, for the value of
sales of other units made by Margetts for New West and for the value of
Margetts' security services in the project.

Disposition in the Lower Court
After trial the lower court entered judgment in favor of New West in the
amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of
Margetts in the condominium and granting possession thereof to New West.

Statement of Facts
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement
with Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West,
by which Margetts agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a
condominium in what later became known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at
Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City. Because the Terrace Falls
Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust Deed on
the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the
completed condominium.
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded
Margetts to enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition
Agreement, with Terrace Falls Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new
name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by which Margetts would receive
credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit in the project
-2-

of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the
date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the
project to construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts
was recorded December 22, 1981 (Exh.3).
3. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margett's
attorney, requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings
& Loan Association, the construction lender on the Terrace Falls
Condominiums, on September 12,1984 (R.539, p.292). This was followed by
a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request
(Exh.5).
4. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens of
American Savings and Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums
and its principals were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was
going to foreclose its first trust deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums
and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein unless it could obtain a release of all
junior liens against the project, including Margetts' trust deed. Mr. Snow and
Mr. Stevens then offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his trust
deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit
of $150,000.00 towards the purchase of a condominium (R.539, pp.203-4;
R.538, pp.61-63).
5. Mr.

Snow

prepared

and

delivered

several

agreements

(Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General
Release, and Request for Reconveyance), giving Margetts the $150,000.00
credit and made several requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next
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two months that the agreements be signed and returned because all other
lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up the whole settlement
(R.539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R.538, p.135). Margetts refused to do so.
6. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was
anxious to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting
with margetts, without his attorney, on November 14, 1984. Mr. Margetts
again refused to sign the agreements (R.538, pp. 125-6; R.539, p.210). Mr.
Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr. Snow thought he
could present a better deal to him (R.539, p.211).
7. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he
was presented with an additional agreement (Exh.10 and 16) which would
give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the
condominium project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously
prepared Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement,
General Release, and Request For Reconveyance.

Mr. Snow assured

Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty
percent agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound
by that agreement. Mr. Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R.538,
pp. 139-140; R.539, pp.212-214). He further told Margetts that he would get
what he wanted by that agreement, that only seven condominiums had to be
sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that American Savings did
not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American would be
Terrace Falls Condominiums.
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8. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh.11) and
Terrace Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-inlieu of foreclosure conveying the entire project to American and American
took over the completion and operation of the project (Exh. 4).
9. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the
condominium unit to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain
specified finish items had been completed in the unit, which would be no later
than June 30,1985 (Exh.6, 1f6; Exh.7, 1f6).
10. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not
finish the unit as required by the agreement (Exh.22, 24-27).

Margetts paid

$9,234.00 of his own money to partially finish the unit (R.465, p.3) and he was
told by American's attorney to move into the unit on August 25, 1985 even
though American did not have a certificate of occupancy and could not deliver
title to Margetts (R.539, p.226-8).
11. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security
personnel on the project relying on Margetts' presence in the project as
security for the whole project (R.539, p.233).
12. American did not form the owners association for the condominium
project until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any
assessments, taxes, or rent on the unit (R.539, pp.233-235).
13. In reliance on the Twenty Percent Agreement signed as an
inducement for Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement
and other agreements, Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy
condominium units in the project (R.539, p.230).
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14. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and
convey title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of
units sold to purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items
paid by Margetts. It also refused to allow him to select another unit as
provided in the agreements.
15. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to
American, caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that
he vacate the unit within five (5) days (R.538, p.178).
16. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this
action for unlawful detainer (R.2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim
asserting that he was entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by
fraud and deception to surrender his trust deed on the project and to pay an
additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was entitled to a credit of
$16,000.00 for finish items and further amounts for security services against
the purchase price of his unit (R.27-51).
17. Fabian and Clendenin, the attorneys for New West in this matter,
represented Margetts and his family and business interests for 29 years prior
to the transactions involved in this case, including some counsel with respect
to the transaction to exchange condominiums which led to this lawsuit
(R. 104-107).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED.

The firm of attorneys representing New West represented Margetts for 29
years and advised him on matters which eventually gave rise to this suit.
-6-

There is an irrebuttable presumption that confidential information was
disclosed. The Rules of Professional Conduct and other ethical standards
require that New West's attorneys be disqualified. Enforcement of such Rules
and standards after the fact is only effective if the judgment resulting from the
improper representation is reversed.

II. ALL THE DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THE TWENTY PERCENT
AGREEMENT, WERE ONE TRANSACTION AND ONE AGREEMENT.
New West has based this action on documents which Margetts refused
to sign until he was presented with the Twenty Percent Agreement as
incentive and inducement to sign the others. They were all signed at the
same time and as a part of the same transaction and must be construed
together as one agreement. That means that New West is jointly bound with
Terrace Falls to perform the promises made to Margetts in return for the
release of his lien.

III. NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS
CONDOMINIUMS.
Besides being bound jointly with Terrace Falls to perform the promises
made to Margetts, New West is also bound because those promises and
representations were made by the agent of its predecessor, American
Savings & Loan. That agent was placed in a position by American where
Margetts was justified in assuming he was acting and speaking for American.
That agent was the only person who dealt with Margetts and he was
authorized by American to negotiate for it and to draft agreements for it. That
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agent was also paid by American. American, and New West, have accepted
the benefits obtained from Margetts and have ratified those acts and are
estopped to deny their liability therefor.

IV. NEW WEST IS BOUND, AS THE SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF
TERRACE FALLS, TO HONOR THE AGREEMENT WITH MARGETrS.
New West's predecessor purchased everything owned by Terrace Fails,
leaving it with nothing. It purchased the name "Terrace Falls'1 and the
business of selling condominiums. It agreed to pay any sums required to be
paid to obtain the release from Margetts. It intentionally chose to step into
American's shoes rather than foreclose and terminate Margetts' interest. It still
does business as Terrace Falls Condominiums and is selling the units from
which Margetts' unit was to be paid for. New West is obligated to perform the
agreement with Margetts and honor the representations made to him by
crediting him with twenty percent of the proceeds of the sale of other units.

V.

MARGETTS IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR DAMAGES.
The representations made to Margetts induced him to give up his lien on

the property.

Therefore, if he does not receive the credit towards the

purchase of his unit, he is entitled to rescission and reinstatement of his lien
or damages for his loss on the grounds of fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
duress, mistake, unconscionability or unfair dealing.
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VI. THE J U D G M E N T FOR R E N T H A S N O BASIS IN L A W O R FACT.
The judgment for rent of $17,100.00 was not based on any kind of
agreement, express or implied. The elements of unjust enrichment were not
pleaded nor proved. Both parties benefited from Margetts' occupancy of the
unit, New West more than Margetts. Besides saving the cost of security
personnel which were dismissed because of Margetts1 presence, New West
received the benefit of five sales of units, the buyers of which were referred by
Margetts. It is not inequitable that Margetts retain any benefit he received.

VII. THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER HAS NO BASIS IN
LAW OR FACT.
Strict compliance with the unlawful detainer statute is required in order to
take advantage of the severe and summary remedies which it provides. New
West failed to comply because there was no periodic tenancy and no
conversion of that tenancy to a tenancy at will. The Notice to Quit was not
served as required by the statute.

New West also suffered no actual

damages from Margetts' tenancy because Margetts1 wife was not served and
was entitled to remain in possession. Nominal damages are the most that
could be awarded.

VIII. THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES HAS NO BASIS IN LAW
OR FACT.
There is no statute or agreement which provides for attorney's fees in this
case. New West abandoned its claim under the purchase agreement and,
therefore, cannot claim fees thereunder. The judgment was not based on the
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agreement. There was also no evidence of or stipulation as to attorney's fees
from which the court could make a determination of reasonableness.

IX. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT ALLOWABLE.
The prejudgment interest was calculated on what the court found to be
the fair rental value of the property. That finding is the province of the trier-offact from the testimony of experts and, therefore, could not have been
determined at the time with mathematical certainty. Therefore, prejudgment
interest may not be included in the judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

NEW WEST'S ATTORNEYS, FABIAN AND CLENDENIN,
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED BECAUSE OF THEIR
FORMER REPRESENTATION OF MARGETTS AND HIS
FAMILY AND BUSINESS ENTITIES.
Margetts, in his answer, raised the question of the conflict of interest
presented by Fabian and Clendenin's representation of New West in this
matter (R.31-2). Immediately thereafter, he filed a motion to disqualify them
(R.97) supported by his affidavit (R.104-7) disclosing the fact that Fabian and
Clendenin had performed work for and represented Margetts for 29 years for
which he had paid them over $100,000.00 in legal fees. These services
included numerous matters involving his business and personal matters,
including setting up family trusts for his wife and children and advice on the
-10-

trade of his Park City Condominium for an interest in the Terrace Falls project
involved in this case (R. 105-107, H6). All of these matters were extracted
from his diary. This representation only terminated because of a conflict of
interest over some of these matters. Understandably, Margetts was incensed
when "his" law firm filed this suit against him. Despite his objections, Fabian
and Clendenin has persisted in its actions against him and refused to
withdraw based on the argument that none of the present attorneys in the firm
performed services for him.
Nevertheless, there is a larger principle involved. As stated in Maraulies
v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), at 1204:

Among the guidelines for professional conduct which we have
approved is Canon 9, which states: "A lawyer should avoid even
the appearance of professional impropriety." The basis of this
tenet is that society's perception of the integrity of our legal
system may be as important as the reality, since it is the
perception that engenders public confidence that justice will be
dispensed.
One can imagine the perception Margetts or anyone associated with him has
of our legal system when the law firm, which represented him for 29 years
and to whom he paid over $100,000.00, sued him and the court allowed him
to do it. That perception goes far beyond Margetts and his associates and
family as this matter has become public. The Rules of Professional Conduct
are designed to prevent this but

the Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile
human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The
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Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.
(Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble, 12, under "Scope")
Yet, the Rules are fairly specific. Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would
permit with respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known.

Rule 1.10 makes this Rule applicable to all lawyers in the firm when any one
of them practicing alone would be prohibited from representing a client. Even
the termination of a lawyer from the firm doesn't avoid the conflict in a matter
that "is the same or substantially related" or if "any lawyer remaining in the
firm has information" that is confidential or could be used to the client's
disadvantage (Rule 1.10(c)).
In this case, members of the firm advised Margetts on the very
transaction which eventually resulted in this lawsuit. That makes this a matter
which "is the same or substantially related." In addition, members of the firm
may have, or files of the firm may contain, information about the assets of
Margetts that could assist them in collecting any judgment against Margetts.
Use of that information would be "to the disadvantage of the former client."
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The firm not only knows and has records of his business interests but also
prepared trusts for his wife and children to which assets were transferred.
Although it is not a part of the record in this case, it is interesting that this
same firm has now filed an action against Margetts' wife to recover from her
the judgment entered in this case. How can it be known that that action was
not taken as a result of knowledge concerning assets that were transferred to
her pursuant to the estate planning done by members of the firm? No such
accusation is being made but such a possibility exists and what does that do
to "the appearance of professional impropriety"?
Cases under Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its
predecessors hold that

the communication of confidential information is presumed once
a showing is made that the matter in which an attorney formerly
provided representation is substantially related to matters in the
pending action.

The majority rule is that the presumption of disclosure is not
rebuttable when the interests of the previous client are adverse
to a client whom the attorney now is representing. Carlson v.
Lanadon. 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988) [a case in which the
alleged but denied representation of the former client took place
twelve years previously and involved documents now in
litigation].
The Court will assume that during the course of the former
representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney
bearing on the subject matter of the representation. I will not
inquire into their nature and extent. Only in this manner can the
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the
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rule relating to privileged communications be maintained. (T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. Inc.. 113 F. Supp. 265,
268-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The attorneys in those cases, as well as in Maraulies v. Upchurch. supra.
were disqualified. New West's attorneys in this case should also have been
disqualified. The lower court's refusal to do so should be reversed and the
entire judgment resulting from the inappropriate representation should be
overturned.

POINT II

THE TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT WAS A PART
OF MARGETTS' AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE A
CONDOMINIUM AND TO RELEASE HIS TRUST DEED
AND MUST BE CONSTRUED AS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF THAT TOTAL AGREEMENT.

It is clear from the testimony of Margetts and Mr. Snow that Margetts
would not have signed the Condominium Purchase Agreement, Settlement
Agreement, General Release and Request for Reconveyance if the Twenty
Percent Agreement were not part of the total agreement. He had already
refused to sign those other agreements several times including on the
morning of November 14, 1984 when he met with Mr. Snow.

On that

occasion, Mr. Snow told him to come back later that day because "maybe
there's a way that we can get you Condominium 413" (R.539, p.211). When
Margetts returned Mr. Snow presented him with the Twenty Percent
Agreement as an "incentive" (R.539, p.211) and explained to him that "they
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only have to sell seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid
for" (R.539, p.212) and that Margetts would get what he wanted by such an
agreement (R.539, p.213). Margetts was clearly induced to sign the other
documents by the presentation of the Twenty Percent Agreement and would
not have signed those documents without it (R.538, p.130, R.539, p.219). Mr.
Snow even wrote on the Twenty Percent Agreement that the others would not
be delivered unless the Twenty Percent Agreement was signed and delivered
simultaneously (Exh.16, R.538, p.134).
Under these circumstances the principle set forth in Bullfrog Marina Inc.
v. Lentz. 28 U. 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270-271 (1972) applies:
"[T]he trial court found that after full consideration of the entire
transaction, including the purpose to be served by the lease and
the employment contract, defendant would not have leased the
boats to plaintiff, unless he could operate the houseboat rental
service.
The trial court concluded that the lease and
employment contract bore a relationship to one another and
should be considered as one agreement . . . . [W]here two or
more instruments are executed by the same parties
contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of the
same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will
be read and construed together so far as determining the
respective rights and interests of the parties although they do not
in terms refer to each other."
See also Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv. 740 P.2d 1357
(Utah 1987): Atlas Corp. v.. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987);
First Security Bank v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983). Likewise the
agreements to purchase the condominium and to release the trust deed
would not have been signed without the Twenty Percent Agreement. They
should be considered as one agreement.
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POINT III

NEW WEST IS BOUND BY THE TWENTY PERCENT
AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTS AND
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY WHO HAD
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR
ITS PREDECESSOR AND BECAUSE IT HAS RATIFIED
THE AGREEMENT AND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE
AGREEMENT BY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE
BENEFITS THEREOF.

New West, of course, contends that it is not bound by the Twenty Percent
Agreement because it was not signed by American Savings even though it
has accepted and had the benefit of the consideration given by Margetts for
that agreement. Margetts, of course, only knew what Mr. Snow was telling
him so the question is whether he was justified in relying upon Mr. Snow.
From the very beginning of these negotiations with American Savings Mr.
Snow was its spokesman. At the first meeting with a representative of
American it was Mr. Snow who did most of the talking (R.539, p.264), and it
was Mr. Snow who made the offer to Margetts (R.539, p.265). It was clear that
the offer was being made by American and that any deal would have to be
made with American. It would be paying the money or conveying the unit
being offered. After that meeting it was Mr. Snow who called to increase the
offer and it was Mr. Snow who had all further contact with Margetts or his
attorney right up to the signing of all of the documents by Margetts. It was Mr.
Snow who drafted the documents presented to Margetts and who revised
those documents at the request of Margetts. There was no question in
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Margetts' mind that Mr. Snow was speaking for and representing American.
This was especially true when Mr. Snow told him "they only have to sell seven
condominiums and your condominium will be paid for" (R.539, p.212), that he
would get what he wanted by such an agreement (R.539, p.213) and
American doesn't need to sign the agreement because "with the deed-in-lieu
of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" (R.539, p.214).
What else could Margetts believe but that he represented and was speaking
for American?
By allowing Mr. Snow to speak for them, American placed Mr. Snow in a
position of apparent, if not actual, authority to bind it. Mr. Lee Stevens,
American's representative, appeared with Mr. Snow and allowed him to
speak for him and to make and increase American's offer.

American

approved ail changes in the agreements and paid Mr. Snow's fees incurred in
dealing with Margetts and others. These facts clearly establish Mr. Snow as
an agent with authority to act for American.
The principle of agency that governs here was stated in Kline v. MultiMedia Cablevision. Inc.. 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), in which the
court answered a question certified to it by a federal court as to when a
corporation is liable for punitive damages for the wrongful acts of its agent.
As a preliminary matter the court set forth these two well-established legal
principles, at 713:
First, a corporation is liable for the torts of its agent when
committed within the scope of the agent's authority and course
of employment even though it did not authorize or ratify the
tortious acts Russell v. American Rock Crusher Co.. 181 Kan.
891, 894, 317 P.2d 847 (1957). A related rule of law states a
principal is responsible for the torts of its agent where the
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tortious acts are incidental to and in furtherance of the principal's
business, even though outside the scope of the agent's authority.
Williams v. Community Drive-ln Theater. Inc.. 214 Kan. 359, 520
P. 2d 1296 (1974).

If those principles apply to the wrongful acts of the agent, they also apply
to acts which are not wrongful but are performed to carry out the purposes of
the corporation, as was the case here. See Ficke v. Alaska Airlines. Inc.. 524
P.2d 271 (Alaska, 1974), where the court held that an attorney retained to
negotiate the terms of an agreement binds his client to promises made within
the scope of that authority although not authorized. And, even though New
West now claims Mr.Snow had no authority to act for its predecessor, he was
clearly authorized by American to prepare and obtain the signature of
Margetts on the settlement agreements and it is bound by the acts of Mr.
Snow which are "incidental to and in furtherance of that object "even though
outside the scope of his authority.
This principle has also been held to apply to the acts of an attorney who
did not actually represent the party bound by those acts. In Arizona Title Ins.
and Trust Co. v. Pace. 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968), a title insurance
company retained an attorney to defend its insured on a claim on which it had
denied coverage. The attorney settled the claim for $4,750.00 which the
insured paid. The insured then sued the title insurance company to recover
the amount paid to settle. The question presented to the court was whether
the insurance company was bound by the settlement entered into by the
insured's attorney, who was hired and paid by the insurer. The court held, at
473-4:
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However, if the client places the attorney in a position where
third persons of ordinary prudence and discretion would be
justified in assuming the attorney was acting within his authority,
then the client is bound by the acts of the attorney within the
scope of his apparent authority . . . .
. . . . The appellant retained an attorney who, although named as
an attorney of record for the defendants-insured, was primarily
involved in the litigation to protect the interests of the insurer.
The attorney regularly advised the insurer, through its managing
agent, of the progress of the litigation. The insurer was fully
aware of the fact that the appellees construed Ellis's
representation of them to be nominal only and that Ellis was
acting for the insurer.
Therefore, when Ellis advised
compromise of the Bailey's claim and volunteered to effect it on
behalf of the appellees, they were justified in assuming that he
had authority to do so. Under such circumstances, appellant is
estopped to assert otherwise and is thereby bound by the act of
its attorney.

Here we have a similar situation where Mr. Snow nominally represented
Terrace Falls but was paid by, gave advice to and took direction from
American. The only difference was that Margetts was on the other side of the
matter and would be less likely to know of any lack of authority of Mr. Snow to
act for American. Our case is, therefore, a stronger one for holding that Mr.
Snow had apparent authority to act for American and that Margetts was
justified in assuming he had authority.
Utah cases also hold that a party, including the State, is bound by the
acts of attorneys which it places in a position where others will rely on those
acts. Goraoza. Inc. v. Utah State Road Commission. 553 P.2d 413 (1976),
held that the State was bound by an agreement entered into by its attorney
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which obligated the State to provide access to property which the State had
not authorized. The court went on, at 415, to point out that the State
proceeded to act pursuant to the agreement and in accordance
with the benefit it received therefrom, so there is at least some
plausibility to the idea that is should be deemed to have ratified
and/or to be estopped from repudiating that contract.

In a suit brought by the payee of a usurious promissory note against both
the makers of the note and the attorney who was retained by the makers to
draft the note, the court in Silver v. George. 618 P.2d 1157 (Haw. App. 1980),
held the makers and the attorney liable for the damage caused in these
words, at 1159:
We hold that it is a per se violation of an attorney's duty for him to
draw a note, which is on its face usurious, that that duty runs at
least to the named parties to the note, including the payee, even
though the payee did not hire him or pay his fee; that the
attorney is the agent for his clients in drawing the note; and that
his clients should not be permitted to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the payee when the attorney draws a note which
violates the law and thus confers a benefit upon his client at the
expense of the relying and innocent payee.

While the terms of the agreements themselves, in our case, did not
violate the law, Margetts innocently relied upon the attorney hired by
American to draft those agreements and it should not be permitted to be
unjustly enriched at the expense of Margetts by taking advantage of the
benefit conferred upon it by the actions and representations of that attorney.
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That American was directly involved in the whole process through Mr.
Snow and was well aware of the benefit it was to receive from the transaction
with Margetts is clear from the testimony of Mr. Snow. He testified as follows:
If it wasn't satisfactory to American, then the deal wouldn't go
through; so I had to run the documents past American. (R.538,
p.83)

And then, in my sending documents back and forth to Roulhac
Gam, it was clarified what documents were needed and what
the form of those documents would have to be.
Q. But, did you talk to Roulhac Garn about that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did she indicate they were mandatory, that those
documents be signed by Jack Margetts?
A. She indicated that it was mandatory that Jack Margetts,
along with all the other lienholders, reconvey their interest in the
project. (R.538, pp.102-3)

Q. That intent was communicated to you by someone at
American?
A. Yes. (R.538, p. 113)

. . . did American at any time inform you that they were willing
to pay your fee in part because the work that you were doing
was of substantial benefit to American?
A. Yes. (R.5, p.117)
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Q. So, when you drafted it, revised it, prepared it, negotiated
about it [referring to Exhibit 7], that was solely for American
Savings, is that correct?
A. Yes. (R.538, p.123)

Question: [Referring to the Twenty Percent Agreemenl]
After preparing this, did you discuss this agreement with
American?
Answer: Probably.
A. Yes. As far as it goes in context, yes.
Q. Is that what you said?
A. Yes. (R.538, p. 133)

Even Rouihac Gam, the San Francisco attorney for American, who
disingenuously denied that Mr. Snow was American's Salt Lake attorney,
admitted the benefit to American of Mr. Snow's work. Her testimony was:

Q. Did it prove, also, of value to American Savings?
A. I don't know. The transaction wouldn't have closed
without these agreements.
Q. It was vital then, was it not, that all of these documents be
signed?
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A. Yes.
Q. And they were all required by the deed-in-lieu agreement
that you prepared?
A. Yes. (R.539, p.311)
American wanted to obtain a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and a release of all
liens against the property. It paid Mr. Snow to accomplish that. Mr. Snow
succeeded in accomplishing that only by making representations to Margetts
which induced him to sign the agreements and release his lien against the
property. American received the benefit of that release. New West, as
American's successor, has accepted that benefit but now refuses to recognize
the representations made by the agent who obtained that benefit. If the
principles of actual or apparent authority do not bind New West to those
representations, then the principles of ratification and estoppel by acceptance
of the benefits obtained by those representations do bind New West.

POINT IV

NEW WEST, AS THE SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO
TERRACE FALLS BY DEED WITHOUT A
FORECLOSURE AND BY ITS PREDECESSOR'S
CONTRACT WITH TERRACE FALLS, IS BOUND BY
THE AGREEMENT OF TERRACE FALLS WITH
MARGETTS TO GIVE HIM CREDIT AGAINST THE
PRICE FOR HIS CONDOMINIUM FOR SALES OF
OTHER CONDOMINIUMS IN THE PROJECT.
New West has suggested that the purpose of the Twenty Percent
Agreement was to allow Margetts to participate in any windfall or kickback
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that might be paid to Terrace Falls after the deed-in-lieu to American. This
suggestion makes no sense since Terrace Falls was conveying its entire
interest in the project and retained no rights to receive anything back from
American. And, of course, anything that went to Terrace Falls in the form of a
kickback would not be made known to Margetts. There was no reason for him
to expect anything from Terrace Falls. The Twenty Percent Agreement was
totally valueless if the credit to Margetts under the Agreement was to come
from Terrace Falls, the partnership which owned the project prior to its
conveyance to American. It would not be selling any condominium units nor
would it receive anything from the sale of condominium units. If that were the
purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement it would be totally illusory and
Margetts surely would not have released his lien and signed the other
agreements in return for such an illusory expectation. Nor would American
expect him to do so, knowing of his refusal for two months to accept what they
had already proposed. In other words, it was totally unreasonable for both
parties to interpret the Twenty Percent Agreement to give Margetts a
percentage of what Terrace Falls might get in the future, which everybody
knew would be nothing. Margetts would not give up his bargaining position
for nothing and American knew he would not.
Furthermore, why would the assignment to Margetts be limited to
$134,283.00, the price to be paid by Margetts under the Condominium
Purchase Agreement with American (Exh.7), if that agreement was not part of
the whole transaction with American. There would be no reason to limit his
participation with Terrace Falls to that figure.
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Therefore, the only interpretation of the Twenty Percent Agreement that
makes any sense is that it was American who was agreeing to credit
Margetts, up to $134,283.00, the stated purchase price of his unit, for 20% of
"any proceeds from the sale of the Project or of any unit or interest therein"
(Exhs. 10 and 16). For this reason Margetts' testimony as to what Mr. Snow
told him about the agreement is entirely credible and the only version of the
conversation that is credible:
Q. After Mr. Snow had presented you with the 20-Percent
Agreement, Exhibit 16, did he say anything to you?
A. Yes. He said, "Do you realize that they only have to sell
seven condominiums and your condominium will be paid for?"

Q.

Did you make any response to that?

A. He made an explanation that I would get what I wanted by
such an agreement.
Q. Did you ask him anything about that agreement, yourself?
A. Yes. I asked him why American Savings wasn't signing it.
Q. Did he respond?
A. Yes. He said, "They didn't need to." He said, "With the
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, they will be Terrace Falls
Condominiums.8
Q. Now, did you believe what he told you?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And did you rely on it?
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A. I relied on it. (R.239, pp.212-4)

That is the only interpretation of this agreement that makes any sense.
American took advantage of that interpretation when it encouraged Margetts
to find buyers of condominiums in the project and actually sold five
condominiums as a result of that. (R.539, p.230)
As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, American became Terrace
Falls Condominiums and is still operating the project under that name. In fact,
the Real Property Purchase Agreement between Terrace Falls and American
(Exhibit 4, H2.B) contains an assignment of the business of selling
condominium units and of the name "Terrace Falls" from Terrace Falls to
American. Thus, American stepped into the shoes of Terrace Falls and took
over the obligation to complete the project and to pay the bills incurred in
owning and operating the project.

It inherited the burdens as well as the

benefits of the project including the obligation to credit Margetts for 20% of the
proceeds of sales in the project. Even if the agreement is considered to have
been made by Terrace Falls, American, as the purchaser of the project from
Terrace Falls, with knowledge of the obligation to Margetts through its actual
or apparent agent, is obligated to Margetts as a third party beneficiary.
Mullins v. Evans. 560 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1977).
This transaction was, in fact, a bulk sale of Terrace Falls inventory of
condominium units to American without compliance with the bulk sales
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, §§70A-6-101, et seq. That
failure makes the buyer, American and its successor, New West, liable for any
obligation not taken care of in the sales transaction itself. The purpose of
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those provisions is to make sure that all outstanding obligations are paid or
provided for in the sale of the assets from which claimants would otherwise
be paid. American and Terrace Falls did attempt to provide for the payment of
such obligations in their Real Property Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 4, U4.E.)
wherein they agreed to cooperate in obtaining the release of liens and
American agreed to pay all sums required to be paid in connection with the
obtaining of such releases. Thus, by its own contract, American agreed to
pay what was required to obtain a release from Margetts and, further, became
obligated to satisfy any claims of Margetts against Terrace Falls as the
successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls and the beneficiary of the release given
up by Margetts in return for the promise of Terrace Falls. New West has now
stepped into the shoes of American and is likewise bound to honor the
commitments made to Margetts.

POINT V

MARGETTS WAS INDUCED TO ENTER INTO THE
AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICAN AND TO RELEASE HIS
LIEN BY IMPROPER CONDUCT, WHETHER TERMED
FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION, MISTAKE, NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION, UNCONSCIONABILITY, OR
UNFAIR DEALING AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OR
DAMAGES.

The facts recited above clearly demonstrate that Margetts was induced to
sign the agreements and release his lien because of the representations
made to him by Mr. Snow. He would not have done so except for those
representations which turned out to be false. All of the elements of fraud are
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present including false, material representations made knowingly or
recklessly, justifiable reliance, inducement and damage. Pace v. Parrish. 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). The elements of negligent misrepresentation
are also present, including pecuniary interest in the transaction, superior
position to know the facts, careless or negligent false representation
expecting reliance and reasonable reliance and damage. Christenson v.
Com. Land Title Co.. 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). Duress and coercion are
also present. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins.. 16 U.2d 211, 398
P.2d 685 (1965).

Since Margetts perception of the agreement was an

essential element of the contract and it is unconscionable to enforce the
contract against him without honoring what he thought he was getting,
unilateral mistake also provides grounds for relief. John Call Engineering v.
Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987); B & A Associates v. L A. Young
Sons Const. Co.. 796 P.2d 692 (Utah 1990). Because Margetts gave up his
entire interest in the project in return for what was an illusory promise, the
agreement is unconscionable and should be rescinded or reformed.
Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co.. Inc.. 706 P.2d
1028 (Utah 1985); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).
Any one or all of these principles have application in this case and entitle
Margetts to rescission of the transaction and reinstatement of his lien or, in the
alternative, to damages for what he has lost as a result. What he has lost
could just as easily be compensated by enforcement of the Twenty Percent
Agreement. In any event the judgment against him in this case cannot be
justified in light of the unfair dealing that has occurred in this matter.
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POINT VI

THE JUDGMENT AGAINST MARGETTS FOR THE FAIR
RENTAL VALUE OF THE UNIT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$17,100 WAS UNSUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT
AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The court entered judgment against Margetts for rent for nineteen
months based on what the court determined the fair rental value to be. This
judgment was obviously not based on any rental agreement between
Margetts and New West. In fact, the court found that no such agreement
existed (R.515, 1116). The evidence fully supports this since Roulhac Garn
did not prepare an occupancy agreement for Margetts (R.539, p.305) and
since no one ever asked Margetts to pay any homeowners' fees or rent
(R.539, p.235) and in fact refused his offer to pay homeowners' fees (R.539,
p.233).

How can the court conclude that Margetts owes rent without an

agreement to pay rent? There must be a factual and legal basis for such a
conclusion.
The only possible legal basis for such a conclusion would be unjust
enrichment, which requires that (1) a benefit be conferred on one person by
another, (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit, and
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit
without payment of its value. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734
P.2d 910 (Utah 1987); Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984). There
was no unjust enrichment in those cases even though a benefit was
conferred on one party. In our case there are not facts to establish these
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essential elements. The court actually found that both parties benefited from
Margetts' occupancy (R.515, 1116). American dismissed its security personnel
because of Margetts1 presence on the project and, in addition, several sales
of units were made as a direct result of his presence there (R.515, TIM 8 and
19; R.539, p.230). That represents a substantial benefit to American which
would exceed any rental value of the unit and, in light of that, it cannot be
concluded that it would be inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he
may have received. The court, of course, made no such finding. Furthermore
New West lost no revenue because of Margetts' occupancy since only three
units in the entire project were rented out. (R.538, p. 151, 161-2) The rest of
the complex was essentially vacant. There is no basis for unjust enrichment.
There is no factual or legal basis for the judgment for the rental value of
the unit and it must be reversed.

POINT VII

THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FOR
$21,600 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS NOR
THE LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED.
The basis for the claim of unlawful detainer was the Notice to Quit on
March 25, 1989. The section of the Unlawful Detainer Statute relied upon by
New West as the basis for this claim is §78-36-3. The only provision that
could apply to this case is §78-36-3 (1)(b)(ii) which provides:
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty
of an unlawful detainer.
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(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite
term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains
in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of
not less than five days;

To come within this provision the tenant must have leased the property
"for an indefinite term with monthly or other periodic rent reserved." The next
subparagraph does not apply unless the property is leased with periodic rent
reserved and then the tenancy is converted to a tenancy-at-will. That was not
the case here. There was no lease and no rent of any kind reserved. New
West's claim for rent before the Notice to Quit and of a tenancy at will after is
inconsistent. If there was a rental arrangement before, that would first have to
be terminated to make Margetts a tenant-at-will. Therefore, there was no
basis for unlawful detainer.
As stated in Perkins v. Spencer. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952),
"unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly
complied with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it." New West
has not complied with the requirements of §78-36-3 in order to place Margetts
in unlawful detainer of the condominium unit.

Furthermore, it has not

complied with §78-36-6 which provides:
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail
addressed to the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of
suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to
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the tenant at the address of his place of residence or place of
business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found
at the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a
conspicuous place on the leased property.

The evidence in this case indicates that the Notice to Quit was mailed to
Margetts (R.538, p.177-8) but there is no evidence that it was sent by
registered or certified mail as required by the statute. The burden of proof is
on New West to show its total compliance with the statute. Without proof of
service by one of the four methods allowed by the statute, the unlawful
retainer remedy is not available to New West. Carstensen v. Hansen. 107
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944).
There is a further reason why the judgment for unlawful detainer cannot
be supported. The Notice to Quit in this case, if served at all, was served only
on Margetts and not on his wife, who resided in the condominium with him
during the alleged unlawful detainer period. Therefore, even if Margetts had
moved from the condominium, New West would have had no right to
possession as against his wife. It, therefore, suffered no actual damaige. In
such a case, Perkins v. Spencer, supra at 449, held that "nominal damages to
vindicate their right to possession against her [him in this case] is all that
could properly be awarded."
The severe remedy of the unlawful detainer statute requires strict
compliance with all of its terms before judgment thereunder is appropriate.
American Holding Co. v. Hanson. 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970); Van
Zvverden v. Farrar. 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). New West has not
complied and is, therefore, not entitled to a judgment for unlawful detainer. At
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most, it would be entitled to nominal damages. The judgment for $21,600.00
must be reversed.

POINT VIII

THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE
OVERTURNED BECAUSE IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY
STATUTE OR AGREEMENT.
Any award of attorney's fees must be based on either a statute or an
agreement which authorizes such fees. Not even a stipulation will support
such an award. Mecham v. Benson. 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979). The only
statute involved in this case is the Unlawful Detainer Statute which provides,
in §78-36-10(3), U.C.A., for the award of attorney's fees only "if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement." The "lease or agreement" is defined
under §78-36-10(1) as "the lease or agreement under which the property is
held." In this case there is no lease or agreement under which the property
was held.

New West's own attorney admitted that she prepared no

occupancy agreement (R.539, p.305).
New West has asserted that the Condominium Purchase Agreement
(Exh.7, U20) provides for attorney's fees in this case. In the first place that
agreement only provides for fees in a dispute arising "under this Agreement,"
which is not the agreement under which Margetts held the property. In the
second place, New West did not obtain a judgment based on a claim or
dispute under that agreement. In fact, it abandoned its claim under that
agreement when it sought a judgment only for Margetts' occupancy of the
property. When objection was made to evidence as to rental value because
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of the claim to enforce the agreement, New West's attorney stated, "We are
not seeking $134,000.00.

That would amount to specific performance"

(R.538, p. 154), thus electing to forego the claim under the purchase
agreement and electing to pursue only a claim for occupancy. He confirmed
this in his closing argument when he said, "the primary relief that we seek is...
restitution or possession of the unit" (R.539, p.334) and "we have elected to
merely--to proceed merely on a theory of the fair rental value of the property"
(R.539, p.335). Consistent with that position, the lower court only awarded
judgment based on Margetts' occupancy of the property.
Utah cases have held that one cannot recover attorney's fees under an
agreement which he has rescinded. One may not "avoid the contract and, at
the same time, claim the benefit of the provision for attorney's fees." BLT
Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456, at 458 (Utah 1978).

The

abandonment of the claim under the agreement is an avoidance of the
agreement. Similarly, in Cluff v. Culmer. 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976), it was
held, at 499:
However, this court has numerous times said that such a
provision for attorney's fees makes them allowable only for
enforcement of the covenants in the contract. Therefore, it does
not extend to implied covenants or obligations not expressly
included therein. It follows that the trial court correctly ruled that
attorney's fees claimed by the plaintiffs are not allowable.
Since New West was not enforcing any covenant in the purchase agreement,
it cannot rely on the attorney's fee provision of that agreement. There is,
therefore, no basis for the award of attorney's fees.
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Furthermore, Guff v. Culmer. supra at 499, went on to state:
When attorney's fees are properly awardable, they must be
proved as any other damages: either by stipulation that the court
may determine them from his own knowledge and experience,
or there must be evidence upon which to base a finding as to
their necessity and reasonableness."

There is neither a stipulation nor evidence in this case from which a finding of
necessity and reasonableness can be made. That is a further ground upon
which the award of attorney's fees must be overturned.

POINT IX
THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW SINCE THE DAMAGES COULD
NOT BE CALCULATED PRECISELY AND WERE FOR
THE TRIER-OF-FACT TO DETERMINE.
Prejudgment interest is allowable, according to Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.
Rollins. Brown and Gunnell. 784 P.2d 475, at 483 (Utah App. 1989), only
when the damages can be calculated with mathematical certainty

"in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow in fixing
the amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment"....
On the other hand, interest cannot be allowed in cases "where
damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province
of the jury to assess at the time of trial" . . . . In particular,
damages ascertained by determining the fair market value of
real property before and after the damage "cannot be
determined with mathematical precision [and] may be inherently
uncertain."
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The determination of the rental value of real property is in the same category
since that is in the province of the trier-of-fact to be determined from the
testimony of experts. Therefore, as in Price-Orem. supra, prejudgment
interest cannot be awarded. That portion of the judgment, too, must be
overturned.

CONCLUSION
The violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and of the guidelines
approved by the Supreme Court to preserve the integrity of the legal system
require that New West's attorneys be disqualified. This case arises out of the
same transaction upon which Margetts was advised by those attorneys and
there is an irrebuttable presumption that confidential information was
communicated to them. The only effective way to enforce the Rules and
guidelines is to overturn the judgment resulting from the improper
representation in this case.
The judgment must, nevertheless, be overturned because of errors made
with respect to the merits of the case. The Twenty Percent Agreement cannot
be considered separate and apart from the other agreements signed by
Margetts.

He would not have signed them without the Twenty Percent

Agreement and it was agreed to, with the others, at the same time and as a
part of the same transaction. It was, in fact, the incentive or inducement for
the signing of the others. It is, therefore, required that they all be upheld, or
rescinded, together and that Margetts' lien be reinstated or that he be given
credit against the price of his unit for twenty percent of the proceeds of sales
of other units. Since all of the documents constitute one transaction, Miargetts
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is on one side of the transaction and New West and Terrace Falls stand
together on the other side, each of them bound by the promises of the other,
both having received and accepted the benefits of Margetts1 agreement.
Beyond the fact that New West's predecessor and Terrace Falls were
joint parties on the other side of the total agreement, New West is bound by
the acts and representations of Mr. Snow who had either actual or apparent
authority to bind its predecessor. American dealt directly with Mr. Snow, gave
him directions, accepted advice from him, instructed him to draft the
documents, authorized him to negotiate for it and paid his fees for all of this.
That is actual authority and American is bound by all acts within the scope of
that authority or the course of that employment even if it did not authorize all
of the specific acts. It further placed Mr. Snow in a position where Margetts
justifiably assumed he was authorized to act for it.

Mr. Snow was the

spokesman for Lee Stevens, the acknowledged representative of American,
from the very first meeting.

Mr. Snow was the only person with whom

Margetts dealt from beginning to end. He, at least, had apparent authority to
bind American. Furthermore, American and New West had no qualms about
accepting the benefits of the agreement with Margetts. It received what it set
out to obtain from Margetts and kept that with no concern that Margetts didn't
receive what he was promised in return. That constitutes ratification and
estops it from denying Margetts the benefit he was to receive.
A third reason requires that New West be bound by the promises and
representations made to Margetts.

It has received from Terrace Falls a

conveyance of the whole project, including the name "Terrace Falls" and the
business of selling of condominium units and all other tangible and intangible
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assets of the project. Terrace Falls is left with nothing (except a release of
liability) and New West has everything (including liability for any obligations
of Terrace Falls). As the successor-in-interest to Terrace Falls, New West
became Terrace Falls and still continues to operate as Terrace Falls
Condominiums. It is, therefore, responsible for the obligations of Terrace
Falls, especially those incurred in obtaining the releases required to complete
the transfer.
The facts of this case constitute fraud, duress, mistake, negligent
misrepresentation, unconscionability and unfair dealing which entitle
Margetts to rescission and return to the status quo ante or to damages for the
loss to him. Because of this, the judgment against him must be reversed and
a judgment entered in his favor.
Furthermore, the judgment for rent, prejudgment interest, unlawful
detainer and attorney's fees is not supported by the facts or the law. The
judgment for rent has no basis in any rental agreement of any kind and the
essential elements of unjust enrichment are not present.

Both parties

received a benefit with American receiving the greater benefit. It is, therefore,
not inequitable that Margetts retain whatever benefit he received.

The

prejudgment interest is also not allowable since the determination of the fair
rental value of the property is the province of the trier-of-fact from the
testimony of expert witnesses and could not have been calculated at the time
with mathematical certainty. The judgment for unlawful detainer must also be
reversed because the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute
have not been met. There was no lease of the property or conversion to a
tenancy-at-will. The Notice to Quit was not served as required by the statute.
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And, no actual damages were suffered because Margetts1 wife was entitled to
remain in possession even if Margetts had moved from the property. No more
than nominal damages can be awarded. Finally, the judgment for attorney's
fees is not based on any statute, agreement, evidence, or stipulation and,
therefore, must also be overturned.
The entire judgment in this case should be reversed and the case
remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Margetts either
rescinding the transaction and reinstating his lien or awarding him ownership
and possession of the condominium, or damages in lieu thereof, and his
costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
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